Romania: a new chance

Making the most of the current challenges

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Summary


- 1. Macroeconomic assessment
 - 1.1. Growth: structure & dynamics
 - 1.2. External (im)balances
 - 1.3. Labour market
- 2. Fiscal outlook
- 3. Monetary policy
- 4. Sovereign rating outlook
- 5. Forecasts

Data sources: Eurostat, EC, NIS, NBR, Brugel, MinFin, CompNet, EIB, ECB, OECD, WEF, Reuters, Bloomberg, ING




Politics: unfortunate electoral timing


Current structure of the Parliament (2016)



European elections: >49% turnout shifts power (2019)



Latest opinion polls still show PNL scoring very high






1. Macroeconomic assessment

1.1. Growth structure & dynamics




GDP growth structure: imbalanced but improving

Investments made a nice comeback in 2020 so far. Net exports will remain a drag for growth as the trade deficit widens despite contracting demand




Supply side: the lockdown severely impacted private services. Industry was already in contraction since 2019. Constructions could keep the flag up in 2020






Industry continues to underperform

The industrial production began to contract in 2019 and prospects remain weak despite reopening





Automotive and textiles are losing most of the jobs




| | % of total production | % of manufacturing jobs | 1H20 vs 1H19 growth (%) | Net job creation (1H20 vs 1H19) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Machines& transport equipment | 30% | 28% | -20 | -12200 |
| Food&drinks | 12% | 16% | -2 | 0 |
| Metallurgy& metal constructions | 12% | 10% | -14 | 1000 |
| Textiles& leather | 11% | 16% | -26 | -12700 |
| Wood& furniture | 7% | 9% | -21 | -2800 |
| Rubber& plastics | 7% | 6% | -3 | 1900 |
| Chemicals | 4% | 2% | 2 | 0 |



Constructions stay in green


Commercial constructions slowing down but others offset



Constructions still expanding...

...on lagged effects from previous quarters and strong public spending boost


New building permits stay strong



Public works to keep the flag up

Governments commitment to boosting the public infrastructure investments could act as a backstop for the entire sector

House price index 2014-2019



Lagging behind

Despite years of double digit wage increase, the strong negative fundamentals are taking their toll (e.g. ageing population, migration)



Services: IT bearing the growth burden

Transports

• The sector has contracted by 5% vs 2019 and has lost over 9k jobs. Commercial vehicles registration was down 35% at mid-year, pointing to sluggish recovery.

IT


• Thriving sector (turnover up 25%, wages up 15% at mid-year), as companies boost digitalisation and work-from-home schemes.


Engineering

Normally a good indicator of future investments.
 Likely to corelate better with public works rather than private investments.

Telecom

Usually less sensitive to economic cycles









Consumer sector


Wages will NOT contract in 2020



Retail sales and the trade balance: hand in hand



Online sales dynamic: impressive



Wage growth remains positive...

...but statistical effects are likely distorting the picture as lower paid workers are dropped off the base

Sales are back to pre-crisis level...

...and the trade balance follows. Despite a contracting demand in 2Q20, the trade balance deficit has widened to new historical highs


Romanian consumers turn digital

Online sales have boomed this year,
Romania being among the few countries
experiencing uninterrupted monthly
growth in the post-lockdown period




Confidence data

Economic sentiment




Constructions




(!) Consumer confidence




Industry



Retail



Services







1. Macroeconomic assessment

1.2. External (im)balances



Deteriorating external picture





Trade deficit still widening

- The surplus on the auto sector has been shrinking constantly, to the point of becoming irrelevant. The sector could end the year in a deficit for the first time after 7 years of consistent surpluses
- We expected a rebalancing of the trade picture but the reliance on imports seems to be more structural than estimated.

Current account deficit to remain a headache

- In the absence of meaningful FDIs, financing the external shortfall remains reliant on NBR's FX reserves
- We see the C/A deficit at 4.5% of GDP in 2020, same as in 2019, with the higher trade deficit likely to be offset by EU funds inflow to a larger extent than in the previous years
- Even if the C/A deficit improves, its financing structure will weaken




1. Macroeconomic assessment

1.3. Labour market




Lockdown impact on the job market

Suspended contracts




Terminated contracts






Job creation: not succumbing but not a great story either


Monthly net job creation per selected sectors



Manufacturing job creation contracting since mid-2018



Number of workers in the public sector continues to grow





2. Fiscal outlook

Sooner or later...



Budget deficit on the skids

January-September execution (% of GDP)




Understandably high this time

As of July-2020 the budget deficit already exceeded the full 2019 gap.

Around half of it is crisis related


Rigid spending seizing most resources



Hard to scale back

Public wages and social spending (mainly pensions) takes the structural deficit to record levels


Higher rigid spending = higher taxes...eventually






Medium-term fiscal outlook


Largest VAT gap in Europe



Lack of automatic stabilizers leads to discretionary policy



Fiscal impulse limited in Romania by the weaker starting point



Untacked tax evasion

Low compliance rate, WB program for ANAF declared off-track, large share of self-produced consumption in GDP

Limited room

The budgetary semi-elasticity indicates by how much the budget balance changes as % of GDP when the output gap increases by 1ppt.

Fiscal impulse - lowest in Romania

By regional standards, the budget gap will not look overly negative, but its inherent rigidity is the main problem




3. Monetary policy

Keeping many balls in the air




Done with rate cuts


Romania: calmer inflation profile



Inflation to stabilise around the 2.50% target for an extended period




Liquidity management remains a tool of choice






RON: getting more and more expensive

Real effective exchange rate (price deflator GDP, market prices)



May-19 Inflation Report: real effective exchange rate is likely to appreciate



Componenta aferentă efectului cursului de schimb real efectiv (Grafic 4.9), prin intermediul canalului exporturilor nete, este estimată a înregistra în continuare o contribuție în sensul atenuării gradului de stimulativitate a condițiilor monetare reale în sens larg, pe seama aprecierii anticipate în termeni reali a monedei naționale pe cvasitotalitatea intervalului de prognoză, sub impactul diferențialului de inflație față de partenerii comerciali⁹².

Efectul de avuţie şi de bilanţ este estimat a exercita un impact restrictiv asupra condiţiilor monetare reale în sens larg în prima jumătate a intervalului de prognoză şi unul cvasineutru ulterior. În structură, se remarcă, pe de o parte, poziţionarea favorabilă a ratei reale a dobânzii externe (EURIBOR la 3 luni). Pe de altă parte, însă, se evidenţiază efectul mai marcant şi nefavorabil al creşterii anticipate a primei de risc suveran 3 în prima parte a intervalului de prognoză,



A new 4.8500-4.8800 range is shaping-up, NBR still on top





4. Sovereign rating outlook

Delaying the unavoidable?



Few months to breathe, but Fitch will be at least as tight as S&P

Factors that could lead to an upgrade or downgrade

Agency (review date) **Downgrade Drivers Upgrade Drivers** Moody's For outlook back to stable: Resolution of negative outlook expected over the next 12-18 months absent further severe shocks to the economy and/or Baa3 neg Successful halt and - over the medium-term -(23 Oct) reversal of the structural deterioration in public intensification of financial risks: Continued structural deterioration in fiscal strength Improved **fiscal sustainability** driven by structural while **external imbalances** remain at an elevated fiscal consolidation in the medium-term (higher tax Weaker assessments of institutional and collection and lower share in current expenditure) Steadu reduction in the structural current-account **governance strength**, driven by the absence of a determined and effective policy response to deficit and increased coverage by non-debt generating flows, together with a rebalancing structural challenges in the medium-term towards higher investment expenditure (incorporates policy agenda after 2020/21 elections) For outlook back to stable: Fiscal and external imbalances remain elevated for BBB- neg Government makes headway in anchoring fiscal longer than anticipated, with absence of fiscal (4 Dec) consolidation, leading to stabilisation of public consolidation resulting in higher public and external finances and external position debt or a wider interest bill than forecasted Lack of economic policy synchronization leading to increased exchange rate volatility, with potential negative repercussions on public- and private-sector balance sheets Fitch Confidence that general government debt/GDP will Sharp deterioration in medium-term debt BBB- neg stabilise over the medium-term (e.g. due to postsustainability (e.g. due to failure to offset or delay pandemic fiscal consolidation) (30 Oct) increases in recurrent expenditure and/or Sustained improvement in external debt ratios implement a credible medium-term consolidation strategy post-pandemic shock) Weaker medium-term growth prospects (e.g. reflecting a more pronounced or longer period of economic contraction that leads to permanent sectoral damage)

Comparison of INGF and rating agency forecasts

| | | 2019 | 2020F | 2021F | 2022F |
|---|------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| GDP growth (% YoY) | ING | 4.1 | -5.5 | 5.2 | 5.0 |
| | Moody's (Apr 20) | 4.1 | -5.0 | 4.0 | |
| | S&P (Jun 20) | 4.1 | -5.5 | 4.0 | 3.0 |
| | Fitch (Apr 20) | 4.1 | -5.9 | 5.3 | 4.0 |
| CPI (% YoY) | ING | 3.8 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 3.0 |
| | Moody's (Apr 20) | 4.0 | 2.8 | 3.0 | |
| | S&P (Jun 20) | 3.9 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
| | Fitch (Apr 20) | 3.9 | 2.5 | 3.2 | |
| General government balance (% of GDP) | ING | -4.6 | -9.3 | -6.3 | -3.3 |
| | Moody's (Apr 20) | -4.3 | -7.7 | -6.2 | |
| | S&P (Jun 20) | -4.3 | -8.0 | -4.0 | -3.0 |
| | Fitch (Apr 20) | -4.3 | -7.9 | -4.2 | |
| General government primary balance (% of GDP) | ING | -3.5 | -7.8 | -4.8 | -2.9 |
| | Moody's (Apr 20) | -3.1 | -6.3 | -4.8 | |
| | S&P (Jun 20) | -3.1 | -6.5 | -2.3 | -1.3 |
| | Fitch (Apr 20) | -3.1 | -6.5 | -2.8 | -2.5 |
| General government debt (% of GDP) | ING | 35.4 | 45.9 | 48.8 | 48.4 |
| | Moody's (Apr 20) | 35.2 | 43.7 | 46.8 | |
| | S&P (Jun 20) | 35.2 | 46.2 | 46.7 | 46.6 |
| | Fitch (Apr 20) | 35.2 | 44.6 | 44.9 | 46.1 |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | ING | -4.6 | -3.5 | -3.5 | -3.5 |
| | Moody's (Apr 20) | -4.6 | -3.4 | -2.4 | |
| | S&P (Jun 20) | -4.6 | -4.8 | -4.4 | -4.4 |
| | Fitch (Apr 20) | -5.0 | -3.0 | -3.8 | |



Forecasts

| | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020F | 2021F | 2022F |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Activity | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP (%YoY) | -3.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 7.3 | 4.5 | 4.2 | -5.5 | 4.1 | 5.0 |
| Private consumption (%YoY) | -4.6 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 0.5 | 4.6 | 5.8 | 8.2 | 9.8 | 10.1 | 6.0 | -3.3 | 4.5 | 4.0 |
| Government consumption (%YoY) | -1.6 | -1.2 | 7.4 | -1.6 | 6.1 | -3.8 | 0.0 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 6.0 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Investment (%YoY) | -2.8 | 6.1 | 3.1 | -5.9 | 3.8 | 7.0 | -0.1 | 3.5 | 2.5 | -2.6 | 3.0 | 5.5 | 5.0 |
| Industrial production (%YoY) | 4.9 | 8.1 | 3.0 | 7.7 | 6.4 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 8.7 | 4.4 | -3.2 | -11.0 | 4.9 | 3.7 |
| Unemployment rate (year-end, %) | 7.0 | 7.1 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 4.8 |
| Nominal GDP (RONbn) | 529 | 559 | 592 | 635 | 670 | 712 | 764 | 858 | 952 | 1060 | 1052 | 1130 | 1210 |
| Nominal GDP (€bn) | 126 | 132 | 133 | 144 | 151 | 160 | 170 | 188 | 205 | 223 | 222 | 231 | 246 |
| Nominal GDP (US\$bn) | 166 | 185 | 171 | 191 | 199 | 176 | 187 | 214 | 241 | 248 | 255 | 284 | 303 |
| GDP per capita (US\$) | 8,200 | 9,200 | 8,500 | 9,600 | 10,000 | 8,900 | 9,500 | 10,900 | 12,400 | 12,800 | 13,300 | 14,900 | 16,100 |
| Gross domestic saving (% of GDP) | 20.7 | 22.3 | 21.8 | 24.8 | 24.2 | 24.5 | 22.4 | 21.0 | 19.4 | 19.1 | 21.5 | 21.6 | 21.4 |
| Prices | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CPI (average, %YoY) | 6.1 | 5.8 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 1.1 | -0.6 | -1.6 | 1.3 | 4.6 | 3.8 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
| CPI (year-end, %YoY) | 8.0 | 3.1 | 5.0 | 1.6 | 0.8 | -0.9 | -0.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.5 |
| Wage rates (nominal, %YoY) | 2.5 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 8.4 | 13.0 | 14.2 | 13.1 | 14.9 | 6.4 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Consolidated government balance | -6.9 | -5.4 | -3.7 | -2.1 | -1.2 | -0.6 | -2.6 | -2.6 | -2.9 | -4.4 | -9.6 | -7.3 | -5.5 |
| Consolidated primary balance | -5.4 | -3.8 | -1.9 | -0.3 | 0.5 | 1.0 | -1.1 | -1.4 | -1.8 | -3.2 | -7.9 | -6.3 | -4.1 |
| Total public debt | 29.6 | 34.0 | 37.1 | 37.6 | 39.2 | 37.8 | 37.4 | 35.1 | 34.7 | 35.3 | 45.9 | 49.7 | 51.5 |

https://think.ing.com/forecasts



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