Page 23 - Aanbevelingen om de integriteit
P. 23

the end of 2019. GRECO recommends ensuring that the procedures allowing for investigation and
               prosecution  of  abuse  of  office  (including  passive  bribery)  do  not  hamper  the  criminal  justice
               process in respect of ministers/state secretaries suspected of having committed corruption related
               offences.

               Non-criminal enforcement mechanisms

               107.   As  referred  to  in  this  report,  there  are  a  number  of  control  mechanisms  in  place  which
               together provide a rather solid system of control over government business. The “High Councils of
               State” as described in the Constitution include the main ones, i.e. the House of Representatives and
               the  Senate  (Parliament),  the  Council  of  State,  the  Court  of  Audit  and  the  National  Ombudsman.
               These institutions are independent of the government and play an important role in the system of
               checks and balances. There are also inspectorates in the ministries.

               108.   As far as the PTEFs are concerned it would appear that they, to a large extent, are responsible
               for their own acts or omissions, as well as for the acts of advisors and civil servants working under their
               direction. Moreover, ministers and state secretaries are dependent on support from the Prime Minister
               and  this  relation  is  largely  based  on  trust.  Ultimately,  PETFs  are  responsible  to  Parliament.  Both
               Chambers of Parliament have the power to require information from ministers (and state secretaries),
               and the latter have an obligation to provide such information in return, which, as a main rule, goes
               public.

               109.   In addition to political accountability under parliamentary and public scrutiny, there are no
               non-criminal enforcement proceedings applying directly to ministers or state secretaries. Although
               the GET fully understands that this is how the political system is built, it has already stated that there
               is a need to further develop rules/guidelines in respect of PTEFs as a complement to the element of
               trust.  To  this  end  GRECO  has  recommended  that  a  future  code  of  conduct  be  accompanied  by
               credible enforcement measures, see paragraph 43 , including a notion of transparency embedded in
               the system.

               110.   The  political  assistants, who  are  liable  under  the  Code of  Conduct of  Integrity  of  the civil
               service in so far as they carry out non-political functions, who fail to comply with integrity rules, may
               be  subject  to  disciplinary  sanctions,  ranging  from  a  written  reprimand,  reduced  remuneration  /
                                                                                                     31
               entitlement  or  fine  to  full  or  partial  withholding  of  salary,  transfer,  suspension  or  dismissal .  In
               addition, the enforcement of a future code of conduct for PTEFs may also cover political assistants in
               certain situations.


























               31  General Government Officials Regulations, Article 80.


                                                           23
   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28