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Misuse of confidential information

90. Article 26 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council of Ministers, Subcouncils and Committees
stipulates that a duty of confidentiality exists in relation to what is discussed or transpires in
meetings. The Handbook for Ministers and State Secretaries (4.1.3) contains detailed rules on
confidentiality in respect of meetings and documents of the cabinet, as well as after leaving office.
The rules of private and public law apply to the acts of former ministers and state secretaries,
including the duties of confidentiality laid down in Articles 98 et seq. and 272 of the Criminal Code.

Post-employment restrictions

91. The “revolving doors phenomenon” linked to high government officials is well-known in the
Netherlands. The GET was informed of several controversies where former ministers were employed
immediately after leaving office in the private sector, with some links to their previous
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responsibilities .

92. The Handbook for Ministers and State Secretaries indicates that when accepting a position
after the end of their term of office, ministers or state secretaries must take care not to create
appearance to have acted improperly during the performance of their official duties or dealt
incorrectly with knowledge gained during that period. Any intention by cabinet members who are
still in office to hold talks on future positions for themselves are to first be approved by the Prime
Minister.

93. Following up on the policy document “Lobbying in daylight: listening and showing”, the
Council of Ministers agreed (2017) to ban lobbying by former Cabinet members (according to
Government circular and the Handbook for Ministers and State Secretaries) meaning that they
cannot act as intermediaries, lobbyists or agents in commercial contacts with their former ministry,
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specifically in the policy areas for which they were previously responsible. The ban aims at
preventing outgoing or former cabinet members from improperly using their expertise, influence or
network as former cabinet members for the organisation that employs them after they leave office.
Ministries have to expressly refuse lobbying by former cabinet members. This covers civil servants,
who may not maintain any commercial contact, in any form (emails, telephone calls or other
telecommunication or participation in a business delegation) with former cabinet members. The ban
lasts for two years after leaving office. The ban on lobbying does not apply to political advisers.

94. However, there are exceptions to this ban, former cabinet members working in trade and
industry after they leave office, may head or form part of a trade delegation organised by the former
ministry. Former cabinet members may also hold subsequent positions in the public administration
(e.g. King’s Commissioner, mayor, member of a provincial or municipal executive), including
membership of a parliamentary representation.

95. The GET notes that, apart from the particular situations described above, there are no
general rules in place concerning post-employment of PTEFs. This is rather striking in a country such
as the Netherlands, where the private sector is large and where the lobbying industry is considered
important for the public sector and the government. The Dutch authorities refer to the obligation
upon cabinet members in office not to take employment contacts without the agreement of the PM
as well as the ban on lobbying by former ministers in respect of their ministry as measures which fit
the Dutch system and conditions instead of complex systems of post-employment restrictions. The
GET accepts that the ban on former ministers is a measure in the right direction; however, this
restriction appears rather limited in scope. The ban on lobbying is not obligatory in all situations and

29 Former Minister of Transportation employed by KLM, former Minister of Finance employed by a bank etc.
30 https://lobbywatch.nl/lifting-the-lid-on-lobbying/

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