Page 17 - Aanbevelingen om de integriteit

Constitutional rule is that members of cabinet cannot also be members of Parliament. To this end the
Handbook contains some rules to temporarily guide outgoing/new cabinet members
leaving/entering a position as an MP during the transition period.

74. Moreover, the Handbook regulates the procedure to be applied by the formateur (future
PM) during the “formation” process of a new government, which aim at preventing conflicts of
interest in the future. The standards on these matters are also contained in the Letter from the PM
to the House of Representatives concerning the Assessment of Candidate Ministers and State
Secretaries, dated 20 December 2002, and the Letter from the Prime Minister to the House of
Representatives concerning the Adoption of the budget statement of the Ministry of General Affairs,
the King’s Office and the Oversight Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services of 2013.

75. As already mentioned, the formateur (future PM) will rely on information, such as the
criminal record, taxation information and intelligence information, provided by state authorities and
the candidate is deemed to have granted such access with his/her candidacy. However, the main
responsibility to submit information and to decide on whether a conflict of interest exists and to find
appropriate solutions to resolve such situations is placed on candidate ministers/state secretaries
themselves. The formateur takes a broad view on the situation and indicates only whether the
chosen solutions seem plausible on the basis of the information provided by the candidates. The
responsibility for the chosen problem-solving approach and its correct implementation therefore
rests to a large extent and primarily with the candidate ministers/state secretaries.

76. During their term of office, cabinet members are personally responsible for not participating
in any decision-making if their participation could run counter to the due and proper performance of
their duties. Ministers or state secretaries are also responsible for not participating in any decision-
making on matters that involve their partner, children, other family members, business relations,
interests, former interests or previous positions, if participating could run counter to the proper
performance of their duties.

77. The system described is to a large extent built on trust and it places the responsibility to a
large extent on the individual candidates/cabinet members to interpret what should be considered
appropriate to report in respect of conflicts of interest as well as how to deal with such instances
when they occur. In such a system, detailed rules, guidance and counselling would be crucial.

78. In this context, the GET considers that the current rules/guidance on conflicts of interest
appear insufficient and that the system would benefit from being reviewed. Turning to the
procedure, while it would appear that the dialogue at the formation stage (of a government) is rather
well developed and that it involves an obligation upon candidates to reveal situations which may
amount to conflicts with future government functions, there is not much of a follow-up procedure to
prevent conflicts of interest as they occur when PTEFs are in office. Just as well as it is important to
check possible conflicts of interest before a government is formed, it is also necessary to do so on a
continuous basis throughout its mandate. In this context, the GET reiterates the need to develop a
strategy to improve integrity and the management of conflicts of interest, as already stated in this
report. The GET also underlines the need to establish more specific rules and guidance on preventing
and resolving conflicts of interests, beyond the issues of secondary activities and financial and
business interests in a future code of conduct, as recommended (paragraph 43) and through training
and counselling as also recommended (paragraph 53). Furthermore, the GET is of the firm opinion
that PTEFs, including political assistants, as appropriate, should be obliged to report various
situations of conflicts as they occur (on an ad hoc basis) as a necessary additional safeguard.
Consequently, GRECO recommends that a requirement of ad hoc disclosure be introduced in
respect of persons entrusted with top executive functions in situations of conflicts between private
interests and official functions, when they occur.

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