Page 11 - Aanbevelingen om de integriteit

explanations and examples. Moreover, such a document should be given broad publicity, in order to
inform the public as to what it should expect from PETFs. It is noted that in this respect, such a code
should also cover political assistants, as appropriate, when they carry out top political/executive
functions.

41. According to GRECO’s longstanding practice, a code of conduct needs to be coupled with
some form of enforcement. The Dutch authorities have in this respect submitted that it is not
compatible with the constitutional law to take measures against ministers and state secretaries with
regard to supervision and sanctions other than those of Parliament, as ministers and state secretaries
are responsible to Parliament. While acknowledging that ministers and state secretaries are
accountable to Parliament, the GET cannot see why, for example, the Prime Minister could not have
a role in supervising the implementation of such a code in respect of his/her government.

42. The GET is pleased that in respect of civil servants (including top civil service officials) there is
a Code of Conduct in place. This Code also covers political assistants. The Code lists integrity values,
including independence, impartiality and reliability. Moreover, it covers the issues of conflicts of
interest, gifts, financial interests, secondary activities, incompatibilities, cooling-off periods, the
reporting of violations and protection of whistleblowers. On the one hand, the GET notes that
political assistants are covered by this Code in so far as they carry out non-political functions; on the
other hand, political assistants or advisers are recruited differently, have different status as
compared to the civil servants and carry out political functions, as reflected above. Therefore, it
appears appropriate to cover political assistants by integrity rules for PTEFs in situations where they
may be influential in respect of PTEFs’ decision making.

43. In view of the foregoing, GRECO recommends (i) that a consolidated code of conduct for
persons entrusted with top executive functions be developed, complemented with appropriate
guidance regarding conflicts of interest and integrity related matters (e.g. gifts, outside activities,
third party contacts, lobbying, etc.) and made easily accessible to the public; and (ii) that such a
code be coupled with a mechanism of supervision and sanctions.

Institutional framework

44. The GET notes that there are a number of institutions which under different mandates are
somewhat linked to integrity and anti-corruption matters in public administration. The Ministry of
the Interior and Kingdom Relations has a systemic policy responsibility for integrity matters in the
public administration. It may therefore appear appropriate to place future work on risk analysis and
integrity strategy matters under its responsibility.

45. A number of ministries have their own inspectorate that conducts inspections in respective
policy areas. They report directly to the top management of a ministry, on both financial and policy
related issues, for the purpose of policy adjustments. A well-organised budget process and a set of
budget rules contribute towards a restrained policy process. Each ministry has its own integrity
officer. These officers collectively form the Cross-ministerial Platform for Integrity Management
(IPIM). The IPIM functions as an advisory body for the top management of the Central Public
Administration in relation to the integrity policy for civil servants. However, the IPIM plays no role in
the integrity policy for ministers and state secretaries.

46. The system of providing counselling, advice and training for PTEFs is very fragmented and
roles are shared by several persons/institutions. It would appear that the PM is responsible for
answering questions on dilemmas concerning cabinet members. However, it would also appear that
the secretary of the Council of Ministers and colleague ministers as well as secretaries general of
ministries, have this function.

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